TYPOLOGY OF MODALITY

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ABSTRACT
The domain of modality is one of the controversial issues of linguistics since there is no unanimity among scholars concerning the nature of modality as well as subcategories included under modality umbrella. Numerous studies have attempted to define modality using various approaches as well as from different angles. The article examines the literature on the issue and splits them into two major groups: the ones which define modality as a hypercategory consisting of subcategories such as epistemic, deontic and dynamic modality types and the second group of scholars who differentiate subjective and objective subtypes of modality. However, each approach has gaps which should be fulfilled. The former does not define common seme which unites epistemic, deontic, dynamic and other so called modality types, whereas according to the latter approach some modality types are both objective and subjective in nature which make the taxonomy irrelevant. Thus, the main goal of the article is to make general claims about the framework of modality domain reviewing the literature on the topic. The research is based on token studies in the field.

Keywords: Modality, Epistemic, Dynamic modality, Objective modality, Subjective modality

INTRODUCTION
It is hard to delineate the notion of modality in a simple way despite it is considered to be the ‘golden oldies’ among the basic notions in the semantic analysis of language (Nuyts J, 2005:5). In fact, as Bybee and Perkins put it, “it may be impossible to come up with a succinct characterization of the notional domain of modality” (Bybee & Perkins, 1994:176). There are several reasons which lead to this kind of conclusion. Firstly, there is no unanimity concerning the nature of modality in a sense that some scholars tend to emphasize subjective nature, others consider objective and subjective side of it equally. Secondly, it is due to the blurred boundary of the modality. There is still no agreement among scholars what to include in the domain of modality what not to. Last but not the least, modality is understood as a united meaning of its subcategories which are still under scrutiny and new concepts are being offered which make difficult to stabilize the semantics of modality. It is not once noted that “the number of modalities one decide upon is to some extent a matter of different ways of slicing the same cake” (Perkins, 1983:10). Thus the aim of this article is to make general claims about the architecture of the notion of modality addressing the issues discussed above.
The article consists of five chapters: Introduction, Chapters 1, 2 and 3 discuss different approaches to modality and the last chapter is a conclusion drawn from the issue.

As mentioned above, modality is mostly understood as a hyper category with sets of specific notions or categories grouped together under modal umbrella. There is no consensus of opinion concerning the terms used to refer to these categories. It is common to use different labels to the same concepts or the single term describes concepts which differ from each other to some extent. For instance, in the works of western scholars modality is traditionally defined in terms of three concepts: dynamic, deontic and epistemic, while post-soviet countries’ linguistics defines objective and subjective modality, then offers different categories under these broad concepts.

The terms ‘epistemic’ (Greek: episteme, meaning ‘knowledge’), ‘deontic’ (Greek: deon, meaning ‘duty’) and ‘dynamic’ are taken from a pioneering work on modal logic by Von Wright. He defines epistemic modality as “modes of knowing”, “deontic – modes of obligation” and callsthemodalconceptswichrefertoabilitiesanddispositionsdynamicmodalities (Von Wright, 1951:4). This taxonomy is used in linguistics, but at the same time ‘pure’ linguistic terms are being offered to avoid logical nature of the modality. In general, the core definition of epistemic category is noncontroversial in linguistics: it indicates to what extent the speaker is committed to the truth of the proposition. But there is a controversy when it comes to deontic and especially, to dynamic modality which makes up research gap in the field.

**METODOLOGY**

There is a large volume of published studies on modality since the time of Aristotle and Kant. Both linguists and logicians attempted to explain the nature of modality. However, category of modality still enjoys hot discussions since there is no unanimity among scholars about it semantics and subtypes. As the paper is interested in linguistic nature of modality, works on modal logic are beyond discussion. In order to avoid exhaustive description of all works in the field we rather concentrate on important or token studies which formulated theoretical framework of modality. The literature on modality contains two traditions concerning the nature and typology of modality: some scholars offer epistemic-non-epistemic modalities; others point out objective-subjective counterparts. The article discusses two directions respectively.

**FINDINGS**

**Epistemic - Non-Epistemic Modalities**

Palmer (1988) in studying modality cross-linguistically argues that “subjectivity is an essential criterion for modality” and defines it as a “grammaticalization of speaker’s (subjective) attitudes and opinion”. On the ground of the subjective nature of modality he offers two-fold taxonomy: epistemic and deontic. Palmer’s epistemic modality includes speaker’s own judgment about the proposition and “the kind of warrant he has for what he says” (Palmer, 1986) i.e. evidentials, while deontic modality deals with permission, obligation and promise or threat. In both cases the source of the judgement or obligation is the speaker. He excludes dynamic modality as it is not concerned with the speaker, but about the subject’s ability, i.e. due to the absence of subjective semantic.

In his “Modality and English modals” (1990), he revises his views on the subtypes of modality and recognizes epistemic, deontic and dynamic modalities. He relates three of them in terms of possibility and necessity as the extremes of the modality scale. He makes binary distinction within epistemic, deontic and dynamic modalities: epistemic possibility and necessity, deontic possibility and necessity, dynamic possibility and necessity (Palmer, 1990).

For example, 1a and b can have both epistemic and deontic interpretations.

1a illustrates possibility degree, whereas 1b stands for necessity degree in the modality scale.

1 a) Meruert may be there now. – It is possible that Meruert is there
(epistemic possibility).
It is possible for Meruert to be there.
(deontic possibility)

b) Meruert must be there now. - It is necessary that Meruert is there
(epistemic necessity)
It is necessary for Meruert to be there.
(deontic necessity)

In epistemic possibility the degree of my certainty in what I am saying is lower than in epistemic necessity. In deontic possibility I am the one to give permission to Meruert making an action possible, while in deontic necessity I am the one who lay an obligation on Meruert making an action necessary do to. But the author notes that in interrogation and in asking permission the deontic source is not the speaker but the hearer. Thus he prefers the term discourse oriented rather than subject oriented. However, this point contradicts to the subjective nature of the modality as was noted above and questions the status of his definition of the notion of modality.

However, in his later work (Palmer, 2001) he proposes slightly different viewpoint concerning the nature of modality as well as subclasses of it. He puts the subjective parameter aside and claimsthat “modality is concerned with the status of the proposition that describes the event” (Palmer, 2001:1). The main subtypes of modality remain as they are in his previous works but they are grouped under hyper categories on the basis of common semantics: propositional modality and event modality. Propositional modality is characterized as a speaker’s attitude towards the proposition and includes epistemic modality and evidentials. Palmer makes a further classification of both epistemic and evidential modalities. Epistemic judgement can be speculative, deductive and assumptive, while evidentials indicated to be reported and sensory.

Palmer’s event modality refers to “an event that is not actualized events that have not taken place but are merely potential” (Palmer, 2001:8). Sub-entities of event modality are deontic and dynamic. Revised view concerning deontic modality is that permission or obligation emanate not only from the speaker as it was in his previous works but also from external source. As for dynamic modality, it is comprised of Abilitive and Volitive. Here Abilitive is concerned not only with subject’s potential but gains wider interpretation including circumstances that enable the subject to fulfil the action. In other words, agent oriented and circumstantial dynamic possibility now renamed as one of the categories of dynamic modality, Abilitive. Here author notes that deontic permission should not be considered as an enabling circumstance for Abilitive, but does not give any reason for it. It should be noted that in some typology of modality it is included in dynamic modality which will be discussed later in this chapter.

The next author who groups deontic and dynamic modalities under one umbrella is Coates J. But she suggests another term for it: root modality. She distinguishes epistemic and root modalities. The tradition to study dynamic and deontic as root has its own longstanding history which will not be discussed here to avoid exhaustive description (Hofmann, 1976; Jenkins, 1972:25; Huddleston, 1976: 85; Sweester, 1982:484). Coates studies the domain of modality from the perspective of English modal verbs’ meanings. She accounts for their meanings using “fussy set theory”, the main idea of which is that the semantics of each modal form a gradience line from strong to weak epistemic or root modality.
and objective or subjective root or epistemic modalities, where strong or subjective modality comprising core of the set while objective and weak modalities belong to the periphery of the set. Moreover, there is semantic area between core and periphery which is called ‘skirt’ (Coates, 1983:13). For instance, may in its root reading is gradient from ‘permission’ to general ‘possibility’, the meaning of must makes a line of strong obligation to weaker sense of necessity (Coates, 1986, p.15). She concludes that the semantics of modal verbs are interrelated and form a continuum which is inappropriate to cut as Palmer does (Coates, 1983, pp. 20-21). Although the study leans on rich empirical data, the author does not define modality at all and it gives an impression that modality is made up by the meanings of English modal verbs.

Bybee et al. propose another set of labels for dynamic and deontic modalities: agent-oriented modality, which “reports the existence of internal and external conditions on an agent with respect to the completion of the action expressed in the main predicate” (Bybee &Perkins, 1994:177) and speaker-oriented modality where speaker imposes conditions on the addressee. The former mostly coincides with Palmer’s dynamic modality and covers ability, root possibility and necessity meanings but also includes obligation which “reports the existence of external, social conditions compelling an agent to complete the predicate action” (Bybee et al., 1994:177) while the latter is close to deontic modality and made up by imperative, permissive, prohibitive, optative, hortative meanings.

Moreover, they suggest subordinating modality, modality marked in subordinate clauses, as well as epistemic (Bybee& Perkins, 1994:177). However, two points should be made concerning the Bybee et al. typology of modality. The first is that, it is rather difficult to understand the difference between agent-oriented obligation and speaker-oriented obligation in their classification. We think that in agent-oriented obligation enabling factor in external such as social rules, Whereas in speaker-oriented modality obligation derives from the speaker. As it is, necessity could cover both internal and external necessities. Secondly, we consider imperative, prohibitive, optative and admonitive as basic illocutions (Hengeveld, 2001) and distinguish it from modality as the “illocution is concerned with identifying sentences as instances of specific types of speech act, whereas the modality is concerned with the modification of the content of speech act” (Hengeveld, 2001:1190).

Complementing the ideas of Bybee et al. on modality Van Der Auwera and Plungian demonstrate their insight into modality in their work “Modality’s semantic map”. Understanding modality as “a paradigm with two possible choices: possibility and necessity” (Van Der Auwera and Plungian, 1998, p. 80), they distinguish four modality domains: participant-internal modality, participant-external modality, deontic and epistemic. Each of these modality types can be classified in terms of possibility and necessity. The enabling factor is internal to the subject of the action, i.e. participant’s ability (capacity), in the case of participant-internal possibility; the action is conditioned by external circumstances in the participant-external possibility modality.

The participant-internal necessity is conditioned by internal need of the participant, whereas the circumstances that are external to the participant make the action necessary to fulfil in participant-external necessity. Thus deontic modality is examined as a subdomain of participant-external modality because “the enabling or compelling circumstances external to the participant as some person(s), often the speaker, and/or as some social or ethinical norm(s) permitting or obliging the participant to engage in the state of affairs” (Van Der Auwera& Plungian,1998:81). Epistemic possibility and necessity is presented as dimensions of modality scale. Their taxonomy is presented in Table 1 taken from their work.

The scope of modality in their work are clear cut and restricted to the paradigm of possibility and necessity. Thus it leaves the volition and non-inferential evidential out of modality boundary.
Table 1. Van Der Auwera J. et al. Modality Types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Participant-internal possibility (Dynamic possibility, Ability, Capacity)</th>
<th>Participant-external possibility</th>
<th>Epistemic possibility (Uncertainty)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-epistemic possibility</td>
<td>(Non-deontic possibility)</td>
<td>Deontic possibility (Permission)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant-internal necessity (need)</td>
<td>(Non-deontic necessity)</td>
<td>Deontic necessity (Obligation)</td>
<td>Epistemic necessity (Probability)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant-external necessity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Necessity</td>
<td></td>
<td>Necessity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Objective and Subjective Modalities

The next group of linguists’ studies the domain of modality from another perspective than the one discussed in Chapter 1. Instead of dynamic, deontic and epistemic subtypes of modality they distinguish objective and subjective modality over subcategories discussed in chapter above or classify them further into subjective and objective types. They make this two-fold division according to the parameter of speaker-relatedness: subjective modality is considered to relate to the judgement of the speaker, while objective modality does not. The terminology was introduced by Lyons (1977), but distinction as such harks back to Halliday (1970) and was continued by Helgeveld (2001), Zolotova (1973), Verstraete (2001). However, each author expands speaker-relatedness parameter with other ones which make the distinction more vivid. Further I will make survey of their proposals for the definition of objective and subjective modality.

Studying the issues of modality from functional perspective Halliday (1970) introduces and accounts for the difference between ‘modality’ and so called ‘modulation’, the former of which is connected with interpersonal function of the language “whereby the speaker inters into communication process in its social and personal aspect” (Halliday, 1970:325), while the latter is linked with ideational function of the language, the function with the ‘element of content’ (Halliday, 1970:326). Thus, according to Halliday modality is “…. the speaker’s assessment of probability and predictability. It is external to the content, being a part of the attitude taken up by the speaker: his attitude, in this case, towards his own speech role as ‘declarer.” (Halliday, 1970:349). Modality as such only covers what we call epistemic modality.

Modulation is defined as a kind of quasi-modality which is intrinsic to the content, which deals with “a characterization of the relation of the participant to the process” (Halliday, 1970:349). It includes what is known as dynamic modality: ability and willingness of the participant and deontic modality. Defining modality and modulation as a part of a single network, Halliday accounts for the distinctive characteristics of each of them. According to Halliday, modality and modulation in addition to their different functions, differs also in their relation with tense, polarity, voice and in the ways of realization in speech. Modality being extrinsic to the proposition is as well as outside the domain of tense, polarity and voice whereas the modulation is subject to modification by tense and negation but Ability is inherently active, while Permission/Obligation are inherently passive. Both modality and modulation is realized in speech verbally and non-verbally. Moreover, verbal and non-verbal forms can co-occur but the result of it is different in modality and modulation. In the case of modality verbal and non-verbal forms are in a concord relation while in modulation they are in a cumulative relation. Along with fundamental distinctions Halliday mentions ambiguities and blends which occur between

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1 In post-soviet linguistics modality is understood as: 1) reference of the proposition to the reality; 2) the relation of the subject of the utterance to the action (e.g. subject can, must or want to do something); 3) the degree of confidence of the speaker in the proposition. Thus, first and second interpretations make up objective modality while third can be referred as subjective modality.
modality and modulation. The ambiguity of one type arises due to the common forms which express both modality and modulation. He states that in case of (i) occurs ambiguity therefore the hearer should select either modality or modulation reading, while in case of (ii) and (iii) occurs blend, i.e. it is not necessary to choose between modality and modulation reading as they are overlapped:

(i) non-oblique modal + simple infinitive (e.g. must do)
(ii) oblique modal + simple infinitive (e.g. should do)
(iii) oblique modal + past infinitive (e.g. should have done) (p. 343)

Another type of ambiguity arises due to the common semantic area shared by modality and modulation. In the passive type of modulation, the source of permission or obligation is either the speaker or someone else, some kind of rule, regulation etc. Halliday points out that if the condition is imposed by “the speaker himself then it becomes a kind of modality” [349 p.] since it is speaker’s opinion which makes the action necessary or possible. Thus, the boundary of Halliday’s modality and modulation is hazy and opaque, for this reason arises another question whether it is reasonable to consider the two domains separately?!

Denying the distinction made by Halliday Lyons (1977) states that epistemic modality is not only subjective as some linguists consider (referring to Kuryłowicz (1964) and Halliday (1970 a)) but also recognizes objective subtype, the distinction of which lies in the quality of evidence the speaker has for his opinion. In the case of objective epistemic modality speaker’s opinion is based on some quantifiable fact or knowledge, while in subjective epistemic modality the speaker merely expresses his “opinion, or hearsay, or tentative inference” (Lyons, 1977:799). For instance, when speaker states Alfred is unmarried he is either merely giving his intuitive opinion i.e. subjective conclusion, or he knows the community of ninety people which Alfred belongs to and whose 1/3 is unmarried and establishing the marital status of 29 of them the speaker can express objective probability of the truth of the opinion he is giving. Thus he is giving objective conclusion. However, Lyons also states that in everyday speech we do not make this kind of calculation to back up our opinion. That is why we think that it is more the subject of modal logic, which is not considered in this work, rather than linguistic issue. Moreover, Nuyts states that what Lyons treats as objective epistemic modality is in fact belongs to the realm of evidentially since “(epistemic) modal qualification always involve a speaker’s estimation of the chances of a state of affairs occurring in the world or not” (Nuyts, 1992:82) but not involve the evidence to support the judgement.

The next author who addresses the issue of objective and subjective modality is J.-C. Verstraete (2001:1505-1528). He distinguishes objective modality which is content-related and subjective modality which involves speaker’s judgment concerning the propositional content of the clause. He bases his classification on three grammatical criteria such as the behavior of objective and subjective modals in the protasis of a conditional construction, secondly, interaction of modals with declarative-interrogative system, finally, relation of modals with tense. According to the first criterion, the distinction between objective and subjective modality is connected with the influence of protasis clause to the interpretation of modals, i.e. when subjective modality occurs in the protasis the modal do not reflect the current speaker’s opinion, but has echoic interpretation expressing the opinion which has already been voiced in the preceding discourse (Verstraete, 2001:1518), while objective modality can easily occur in protasis clause and its interpretation stay unaffected by the construction. As a result of the first criterion, modals of ability and volition are always objective while epistemic modals always gain subjective interpretation. But the case with deontic modals a bit tricky as they can get both objective and subjective interpretation, i.e. they echo the opinion expressed in the receding discourse and can just express necessity without involving the speaker. According to the second criterion, objective and subjective modals differ in their function in interrogative clauses: “subjective modals are oriented towards the interlocutor under the influence of interrogation, whereas objective modals remain unaffected” (Verstraete, 2001:1521). Here again ability and volition stays in objective realm, epistemic also shows the characteristics of subjective modality, whereas deontic modals either shift the orientation of modals to the interlocutor, for instance in an example 2 the speaker asks the interlocutor’s wish towards the minister i.e. gets subjective interpretation, or asks whether there is a necessity to fulfil the action as in an example 3 i.e. has objective connotation:

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2) Must the minister act now? (Verstraete, 2001:24)
3) Must brake shoes always be renewed in sets of four? (Verstraete, 2001:27)

Thus, according to the second criterion deontic modality behaves as objective and subjective modality. The third criterion is based on the interaction of tense and modality. Verstraete states that objective modals are subject to tense modification while subjective modals are not. Pure objective modalities of ability and volition in past tenses express past ability or wish, however when epistemic modality takes past form it never denotes speaker’s past judgement, it shows tentativeness. As for deontic modals, when it shows external necessity or possibility it can gain past meaning, but when it is connected with the necessity and possibility derived from the speaker it only shows present wish of the speaker. So, deontic modality has the features of objective as well as subjective modalities.

So, the author concludes that dynamic modality (ability and volition) are pure objective, epistemic modality is subjective, while deontic modality is both subjective and objective. It is presented in the Table 2 taken from Verstraete (p.1525, Table 3)

### Table 2. The Subjective–Objective Distinction for Epistemic, Deontic, and Dynamic modality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modality type</th>
<th>Subjective</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Epistemic</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deontic</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamic (ability and volition)²</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Halliday and Lyons’ classification of modality into objective and subjective subtype has some ambiguities which questions the validity of such distinction. Verstraete makes clear cut distinction of objective and subjective modalities reconsidering their classifications and criteria.

**Helgeveld’s Taxonomy of Modality**

In Chapters 1 and 2 we discussed two main perspectives in the study of modality. The first group of linguists offered subdomains of modality in terms of epistemic, deontic and dynamic (root) modalities, while the next group of scholars tried to investigate it from objective and subjective meaning angle. The next author joins these two perspectives and investigates modality according to the two parameters: target of evaluation and domain of evaluation (Helgeveld, 2001:1190). The target of evaluation is concerned with the part of the utterance that is modalized and along this parameter the author distinguishes participant-oriented modality, event-oriented modality and proposition-oriented modality. Participant-oriented modality deals with “the relation between (properties of) a participant of an event and the potential realization of that event” (Helgeveld, 2001:1193), while the event-oriented modality “describes the existence of possibilities, general obligations, and the like, without the speaker taking responsibility for these judgements” (Helgeveld, 2001:1194). Proposition-oriented modality expresses subjective opinion of the speaker towards the proposition (Helgeveld, 2001:1196).

The second parameter, the domain of evaluation, is connected with the perspective from which the evaluation is made. According to this parameter the author distinguishes the 5 types of modality and defines them as follows:

1) “Facultative modality is concerned with intrinsic or acquired capacities.
2) Deontic modality is concerned with what is (legally, socially, morally) permissible.
3) Volitive modality is concerned with what is desirable.
4) Epistemic modality is concerned with what is known about the actual world.
5) Evidential modality is concerned with the source of information contained in a sentence.” (Helgeveld, 2001:1193)

Further, synthesizing the subdomains by target of evaluation with the subtypes distinguished by domain of evaluation Helgeveld identifies 15 possible combinations of modality meanings. Some

²Different authors use the term differently. Vertraete use dynamic for the meaning of ability and volition.
combinations are excluded on the semantic ground. Table 3 displays author’s logically possible combinations of modality meaning, while Table 4 shows the extended variant of former table.

**Table 3. Cross-Classification of Modality Types (Helgeveld, 2001:1193. Table 111.1)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Domain</th>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Proposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Facultative</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deontic</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volitive</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epistemic</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidential</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4. Cross-Classification of Modality Types Extended with Their Meanings**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Domain</th>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Proposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Facultative</td>
<td>Ability (intrinsic and acquired) of the subject of the proposition is an enabling condition for the event type described by the predicate</td>
<td>General circumstance makes it possible to actualize the event type described by the predicate</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deontic</td>
<td>The subject is under the obligation/is permitted to fulfil the action. Here the source of obligation/permission is not shown.</td>
<td>The source of the obligation/permission is moral/legal/social rules</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volitive</td>
<td>The subject’s wish and desire is described</td>
<td>General desire or wish is described</td>
<td>Speaker’s personal wish and desire described</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epistemic</td>
<td>General possibility of the action based on what is known about the world</td>
<td>Speaker commits to the possibility/impossibility of the occurrence of the event described in the proposition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidential</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Speaker specifies the source of the information in committing to the truth value of the proposition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Helgeveld’s taxonomy, facultative and deontic modalities are always objective, while volitive and epistemic modalities have both objective and subjective counterparts. Evidential modality is always subjective.

The author treating the modality in this way tried to give detailed account for the semantics of the modality. Here in Hengeveld’s account as in Lyons’s, Halliday’s and Verstraete’s accounts’ some subdomains of modality belong to the realm of objective modality as well as to the realm of subjective modality which is summarized in Table 5. As can be seen from data in Table 5, the ability meaning is always in the realm of objective modality, while deontic and volitive (volition, willingness) are mostly...
objective. Epistemic modality is mostly subjective in nature. However, we think that in the case of epistemic modality speaker in giving his opinion about the truth value of the proposition always relies on the knowledge he has. Hence, it is unreasonable to consider objective epistemic subtype.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Objective modality</th>
<th>Subjective modality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Halliday M.A.K.</td>
<td>Ability</td>
<td>epistemic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Willingness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deontic ³</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyons J.</td>
<td>Epistemic</td>
<td>Epistemic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verstreate J.C.</td>
<td>Deontic</td>
<td>Epistemic deontic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dynamic (ability and volition)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hengeveld K.</td>
<td>Facultative (ability and general</td>
<td>Volitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>possibility)</td>
<td>Epistemic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deontic</td>
<td>Evidential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Volitive epistemic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In general, the result of literature review on objective and subjective nature of modality questions the relevance of taxonomy of modality as such for defining and stabilizing the notion of modality.

**CONCLUSION**

As the result of the literature review on the topic we can point out some ambiguities in accounting for the notion of modality itself and setting boundaries of modality meaning:

The first ambiguity is what the modality is? In answering this question we likewise side Bybee and Fleischman and account for modality as “semantic domain pertaining to elements of meaning that language expresses. It covers a broad range of semantic nuances – jussive, desirative, intentive, hypothetical, potential, obligative, dubtative, hortatory, exclamative, etc. – whose common dominator is the addition of a supplement or overlay of meaning to the most neutral semantic value of the proposition of an utterance, namely factual and declarative” (Bybee & Fleischman,1995:2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possibility</th>
<th>Participant-internal necessity</th>
<th>Participant-external necessity</th>
<th>Epistemic necessity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-epistemic necessity</td>
<td>(Non-deontic necessity)</td>
<td>Deontic necessity</td>
<td>(Probability)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Ability, Capacity)</td>
<td>(Non-deontic possibility)</td>
<td>(Permission)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant-internal necessity</td>
<td>(Non-deontic necessity)</td>
<td>Deontic necessity</td>
<td>Epistemic necessity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(need)</td>
<td>(Obligation)</td>
<td>(Probability)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant-external necessity</td>
<td></td>
<td>Evidential</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-epistemic necessity</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The next ambiguity arises with the boundary of modality meanings. As it was mentioned traditionally epistemic modality is considered as pure modal concept and it deals with the speaker’s commitment to the truth value of the proposition. As it is seen from the literature the border line of so called deontic and dynamic modalities is nebulous. In order to tackle the problem we likewise side Van Der Auwera and Plungian’s approach to the modality and explain the overlaying meaning to the proposition i.e.

³According to the author deontic meaning as a sub-type of modulation is considered as objective except the cases of ambiguities and blends.
modality, in terms of possibility and necessity concepts. Thus we do not use the term “deontic” as it is and do not use the term “dynamic” at all. Instead we recognize participant–internal and participant-external and epistemic subtypes of modality and classify each of them according to possibility and necessity paradigms. So, the participant-internal possibility deals with ability and capacity of the subject whereas in participant-internal necessity subjects own needs makes it necessary to carry out the action described in the proposition. In the case of participant-external possibility the enabling factor is extrinsic to the subject, it can derive from the speaker (deontic) or circumstance (moral or legal) while in participant-external necessity a speaker (deontic) or a circumstance makes it necessary to fulfil the action. Epistemic possibility shows speaker’s low certainty concerning the proposition, whereas epistemic necessity displays speaker’s high certainty as he has certain knowledge or evident to back up his assertion. In Table 6 is presented the architecture of modality domain which is the conclusion of the paper.

REFERENCES